报告题目：考虑员工随机离职的人力资源招聘问题研究
报告人： 陈震 博士（西南大学）
时间：2023年 3月9日 13:00-14:30
地点：#腾讯会议：899-223-419
报告内容摘要：
本文考虑一个人力资源招聘问题：假设一个单位的员工在每个阶段是否离职服从0-1分布，而员工在每个阶段的总离职数服从二项分布。本文构建了该问题的多阶段随机决策模型，决策目标是最小化人力资源相关的总成本，包括固定招聘成本、可变招聘成本、薪资成本、员工外包成本。通过对模型中离散凸函数与K凸函数的相关分析，我们证明最优招聘策略为 (s, S) 策略：当每个阶段期初的员工数量小于等于 s 时，将员工数量招聘至 S；否则不招聘。本文进一步使用分段近似方法构建了该问题的近似混合整数规划模型，该模型可以快速求解并且与最优成本的误差很小。
【陈震个人简介】
陈震博士，西南大学讲师，北京航空航天大学管理科学与工程博士，英国爱丁堡大学访问学者及访问博士生，研究兴趣为多阶段供应链金融、随机规划、库存管理。已在Omega、IJPR、ITOR、系统工程学报等期刊发表论文多篇，并担任 EJOR、Omega、IJPR、COR、CIE等期刊的匿名审稿人，目前主持一项国家自然科学青年基金。
报告题目：Channel Structures of E-Commerce Platforms with Voluntary Investment
报告人： 赵友 博士（广东工业大学）
时间：2023年 3月9日 13:00-14:30
地点：#腾讯会议：899-223-419
报告内容摘要：
Recent years have witnessed e-commerce platforms that voluntarily invest in new digital technologies to help their suppliers reduce R&D costs (e.g., JD's consumer-to-manufacturer model that provides general proposals for brands' product design). To examine its impact on channel structure, we develop a supply chain model consisting of a supplier and an e-commerce platform who purchases products from the supplier at a wholesale price and sells them to end markets. In addition, the supplier has the option to accept the marketplace by paying a commission fee charged by the platform. We show that the presence of voluntary investment on production improvement can overturn some classical insights from prior studies.
For example, a higher marketplace commission fee can lead to a lower selling quantity in the marketplace, but a higher order quantity in the reselling channel. This stands in strict contrast to the opposite finding when the platform invests instead on demand enhancement. In addition, previous studies suggest that offering the supplier the marketplace option is beneficial to the supplier but is detrimental to the platform. However, with voluntary investment, the platform can benefit from allowing the supplier to encroach via the marketplace, and in some situations the supplier suffers from having such an option. We find that the commission fee and the R&D cost are two interacting forces steering equilibrium decisions for supply chain members, and we characterize the concise operating regimes for the channel structure choices on behalves of the supplier and the platform. A number of extensions are discussed, including product substitution level, investment cost structure, whether the quantity decisions are made simultaneously or sequentially, voluntary investment timing, and endogenous commission fee.
【赵友个人简介】
赵友博士，广东工业大学博士研究生，国家留学基金委公派伦敦大学学院联合培养博士研究生，香港科技大学联合培养博士研究生，研究方向为物流与供应链运营管理、运营与营销交叉研究。研究成果发表在《Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services》、《International Transactions in Operational Research》、《Electronic Commerce Research》、《Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization》、《Managerial and Decision Economics》等SSCI/SCI期刊多篇，并担任《Managerial and Decision Economics》、《International Transactions in Operational Research》、《Transportation Research - Part E》和《European Journal of Operational Research》等SCI/SSCI期刊的匿名审稿人，参与两项国家自然科学基金项目。
欢迎有兴趣的教师，全体博士生、硕士生参加。
学院高层次人才引进办公室
2023-3-7
